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This paper considers the effects of externalities across neighbouring regions on
economic growth. From a simple growth model that includes such externalities, we
derive that they may cause endogenous growth even in the presence of decreasing
returns within the regional economy. Investment rates of a region will be lower than
the optimal, causing growth in the market solution to be lower than in the supra-
regional solution  We have also tested for the presence of such spillovers in the
Spanish regions applying spatial econometrics techniques. Furthermore, the empirical
specification allows to disentangle internal from external within the region
externalities using aggregate regional data.
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“...technology...will be used to refer to something common to all countries,
something pure or disembodied, something whose determinants are outside
the bound of our current inquiry.”  Lucas (1988)
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent theoretical models have emphasized the role of external effects in the
accumulation of factors of production in explaining economic growth (Romer 1986
and 1990; Lucas 1988). The increase in the stock of (broadly speaking) capital causes
an improvement in the technology level that cannot be fully appropriated by the agent
that makes the investment. As a result, the aggregate (social) return of the investment
is larger than the return obtained by the individual agent (private return). The
assumption is that knowledge spills over across the entire economy, therefore
affecting each firm’s technology level.
This paper shares the idea about the relevance of these external effects. However, we
consider that these externalities cross the barriers of regional economies belonging to
the same economic area. This is in line with the idea of interactions across economies
in Lucas (1993): when there are cross-economy spillovers in accumulating human
capital, all economies will converge to the same steady state whatever their initial
conditions. However, this prediction seems to be at odds with empirical evidence.
Then, we will assume that externalities do not spread out in the space without bounds.
On the contrary, diffusion of innovations will be easier within groups (clubs) of closed
economies. That is, we agree with the point in Durlauf and Quah (1998): “It is easy to
see that if we allowed natural groupings of economies to form, so that economies
within a group interact more with each other than with those outside, then the
“average” H (in their case human capital) that they converge to will, in general, vary
across groups.”
The literature has recently stated the relationship between growth and trade, where
trade would be the main channel for diffusion of technology (Grossman and Helpman
1991; Coe and Helpman 1995). Keller (1997) has empirically cast doubt on this point2
for the case of national economies, that is, there could exist some other channels by
which innovations travel from one economy to the others.
In the case of regional economies within an integrated area, we may think of the role
of trade and the other channels as being more intense. Forward and backward linkages
across regional economies seem to be more important than those across countries. The
case for common markets of inputs and output is more likely in the cross-regional
than in the cross-national case as well. As far as these factors may contribute to the
diffusion of knowledge (technological and pecuniary externalities), spillovers could be
stronger across regions than across countries.
i
It is not necessary to carry out a deep economic analysis to realize that economic
activity and welfare are not equally or randomly distributed in the geographical space.
The observation of a map of the world displaying the levels of product per capita in
each country clearly shows clusters of countries in specific areas characterized by high
or low levels. We can also observe this picture for the case of regions within a specific
economy; for instance the NUTS regions in the European Union or the states in the
USA. Actually, this fact can also be observed in the case of more reduced national
economies (as for instance the case of the North-South duality in Italy or Spain).
This evidence can be explained by spatial correlation in the investment rates but also
by spatial correlation in the average level of technology of each economy. In the first
case similarities in saving rates and other preference parameters may mostly explain
the correlation. In the case of technology, the higher intensity in knowledge diffusion
across neighbouring economies will be the main assumption of this paper.
Some of the questions that we would like to answer at the end of the paper are:
* Is it worth considering externalities across regional economies?
* What is the role of these externalities in explaining growth and convergence?
* May across-regions externalities help explaining features such as persistence in the
inequality of the levels of economic development among regions located in different
territories or poverty traps linked to geographical location?3
To achieve this objective, the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 an assessment
of the importance of aggregate regional spillovers is carried out. The empirical
evidence shows how they are at least as important as cross-industry externalities and
how links among (neighbouring) regional economies may explain an important
amount of inequality in the regional income per capita distribution. Section 3 presents
a simple growth model in which diffusion of knowledge, as a result of investment in
capital, is not confined to the limits of the economy in which the innovation is
generated but spills over into the neighbouring economies. As a result, the rate of
growth of an economy will be a function of the investment, and therefore of the level
of technology, of its neighbours. The mechanism could be strong enough to generate
endogenous growth and shows the relevance of having what we could qualify as good
neighbours.
In section 4, an empirical model that allows to measure and test the significance of
regional spillovers is formulated. Besides, it permits the identification of the private
return and the externalities in the accumulation of factors (physical and human
capital) within an economy from regional aggregated data. Section 5 describes the
proposal of applying spatial econometric techniques to consider empirically regional
externalities, while the following shows the empirical evidence for the Spanish
regions in the period 1964-1991. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. REGIONAL EXTERNALITIES: ARE THEY IMPORTANT?
Marshall (1920) formulated the distinction between internal and external returns. The
story is one of increasing returns that are external to the firm but internal to the
industry as a whole. The inclusion of aggregate knowledge as an input to production
may provoke non-convexity, leading to long-run growth and lack of tendency towards
convergence in factors intensity and income levels across economies (Romer 1986
and 1990; Lucas 1988; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Jones 1995). The assumption of
incomplete appropriation of ideas or innovations is the foundation for the
consideration of aggregate knowledge in firm’s technology. New bits of knowledge
spill over into other firms in the economy, increasing their own technology level.
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) have emphasized the role of the interaction between4
private or individual knowledge and aggregate knowledge; returns of additional bits of
private knowledge would be higher for a large enough level of aggregate knowledge.
Besides knowledge spillovers, marshallian externalities could arise due to  other
reasons. This would be linked to the existence of both a specialised market for labour
and output, and of forward and backward linkages. These have been considered as
pecuniary externalities (as opposed to technological externalities) by Scitovsky (1954)
and incorporated in the new theories of industrial location and trade as engines for
agglomeration (Krugman 1991; Krugman and Venables 1995; Puga and Venables
1996; Venables, 1996).
An interesting question is what the geographical boundaries for these externalities are.
Henderson (1992) and Glaeser et al (1992) outline the importance of proximity for
sharing innovations. De Lucio (1997) argues that generation of new ideas and
diffusion of technology is more likely in urban agglomerations. He also shows the
significance of the degree of urbanization in explaining growth of product per capita
for a wide sample of countries.
However, despite agreeing with urban agglomerations as being fountains for new
ideas and innovations, it is sensible thinking of external effects crossing from one city
to the others of, at least, an integrated economy. The role of distance could be more
important for pecuniary externalities than for technological diffusion, because
neighbours may take advantage of contiguity to a saturated economy. That is, it could
be profitable for some of the suppliers to be located in a neighbouring region with a
lower degree of agglomeration, and still take advantage of proximity (Puga and
Venables, 1996). Contiguous regions may also share the labour market and the market
for final goods.
Coe and Helpman (1995) showed the relevance of international spillovers in R+D
investments to growth. Knowledge from R+D investments is embodied in traded
goods. Thus trade partners of a country take profit of innovations in this country.
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Helpman (1997) summarizes the channels through which the technology levels of
different economies are interrelated: “The theory thus suggests two broad ways in5
which trade and (foreign direct) investment contribute to total factor productivity: by
making available products and services that embody foreign knowledge, and by
providing foreign technologies and other types of knowledge that would otherwise be
unavailable or very costly to adquire” (pg 5).
In the case of regional economies, externalities linked to the diffusion of knowledge
may be even more important than in the case of countries. This would be true for the
trade-channel as well as for other possible channels. As an example, in a national
economy, a small number of regions may concentrate most of the laboratories and
centres of R+D, although the result of the research can be applied by different firms
located in some other regions. Furthermore, in the case of public R+D centres the
administration will be interested in spreading out the results to the entire territory and
not to be confined to the firms located in that particular region.
Technology diffusion, further, is likely to be higher across close regions. Relative
amounts of traded goods could be higher in this case than among regions very far
away from each other. Furthermore, local social conditions play an important role in
the way in which each economy incorporates and adapts ongoing innovations
(Rodríguez-Pose, 1998). When contiguous or close economies share similar local
conditions, transfers of technology among neighbouring regions could be more
intense.
Several works, starting from the seminal one by Caballero and Lyons (1990), have
tried to test empirically the existence and size of technological spillovers across
industries within an economy. One of the practical implications of this kind of works
is that, not properly specified, external economies may bias the estimated internal
returns to scale. Nevertheless, most of the empirical models on growth that have used
data for national or regional economies have given no space to spillovers across those
economies.
iii This could be justified if there existed externalities across industries
within an economy but not across economies. Costello (1993) showed  how total
factors productivity growth is more correlated across industries within one country
than across countries within one industry. However, Kollmann (1995) observed that
productivity growth is more strongly correlated across the regions of the USA than6
across the G7 countries. Moreover, correlations across industries within a region are
weaker than across regions within an industry.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize correlations across regions and across industries for the
Spanish regions and manufactures. The upper triangle of each table shows the results
for the growth of Solow residuals, while those for the growth of gross value added are
in the lower triangle. From these results, across-regional correlations seem to be as
strong as across-industry correlations. In the case of total factor productivity this result
supports the relevance of transfers of technology across regions. The larger integration
of the regions, in this case of Spain, would explain why technological innovations
spread more intensely than across heterogeneous countries.
More evidence on the relevance of regional spillovers is given in Quah (1996) and in
López-Bazo et al (1998). Quah shows how, once conditioned to the levels in the
neighbouring regions, the distribution of the product per capita in the regions of the
EU would be more strongly concentrated than the real distribution. In the second
work, the authors obtain strong spatial correlation among contiguous regions in the
EU, detecting significant spatial clusters of regions showing values above and behind
the average.
Summing up, theoretically as well as empirically, it seems to exist evidence on the
relevance of external economies that cross the weak and sometimes artificial regional
boundaries.
3. A SIMPLE GROWTH MODEL WITH REGIONAL EXTERNALITIES
In this section we describe a simple model of growth in which externalities arising
from the increase in the level of technology in the neighbouring regions are
considered. The model shows that the stock of accumulative factors in the neighbours
may affect both the steady-state and the growth rate of an economy. It also may
explain non decreasing returns and therefore endogenous growth depending on the
strength of regional spillovers.7
The model is based on two key assumptions: 1) there are externalities due to the
accumulation of capital within a regional economy, and 2) there are also externalities
due to the aggregate level of technology of the neighbours (that are linked to their
capital stock as well).
We consider a simple economy in which the (average) labour productivity in region i
in period t, yit, is a function of a vector of accumulative factors per worker which will
be synthesized in kit (for instance physical or human capital), and the state of the
technology, Ait:
yA k it it it =
a (1)
with decreasing returns in factors accumulation (a<1).
Following the reasoning in Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), the aggregate level of
technology is a function of the aggregate level of k
iv. Moreover, we introduce the
assumption that innovations/ideas (linked to investments in k) can flow between
economies, that is, there exists technological interdependence between regional
economies. Therefore:




where Dt is a component of the technology that grows exogenously at a rate g
v, d is the
measure of the degree of external returns to k within the region and krit  is the amount
of capital per worker in the neighbours to region i. g is the measure of the regional
spillover effect that is supposed to be positive: when krit increases by 1% (causing an
increase in the technology of those regions), technology in region i will increase by
g%.
Obviously, when d=g=0 and a<1 we are facing the traditional Solow-Swan production
specification, whereas the Romer-Lucas specification with (general) external effects
will be represented by d>0 and g=0.
Substituting (2) on (1):8
yit t kitk it =D t
r
g (3)
where t=a+d. When a regional economy increases its factors intensity it gets a return
of t. If its neighbours increase simultaneously their intensity as well, there will be a
spillover effect that will go up to t+g returns in region i. Productivity in region i will
also increase with kri even in the case of no further investments in ki. This is because
of the technology diffusion from the neighbours which makes the stock of capital in
region i more productive.





















where ci is consumption per capita in region i and d+n the effective rate of
depreciation (temporal subindexes are omitted for simplicity in the notation). The rate
of investment in ki is a decreasing function of its stock in the case of decreasing
returns within the region (t<1), while it is an increasing function of the stock in the
neighbours. This means that investments in productive factors will be larger in those
regions placed in areas with high stocks of these factors, because externalities across
those regions will increase the returns of these investments. On the contrary,
incentives to invest will be lower in a region surrounded by others with low capital
intensity.
Considering this technology we can solve the representative agent’s optimization
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where j>0 is the time preference parameter, n the growth rate of population (j>n) and
s>0 the risk aversion.
The Hamiltonian in this case is:9
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As a general result in the case of this family of models: gc = gk = gy, so that, as shown
previously in (4), the growth rate of region i is a function of the stock of productive
factors in its neighbours. In equilibrium we can assume capital intensity to be equal in
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tg (9)
When t+g<1, that is, when there are global decreasing returns to capital accumulation,


















It depends on the usual technological and preference parameters and on the strength of
regional externalities. The stronger the regional interdependence, the higher the stock
of capital per worker. In this case, all regions share a common steady state because
returns to investment in a group of neighbours is globally a decreasing function of the
average intensity in this group. Therefore, per capita product will equalize within
groups and across groups in the equilibrium.
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(11)10
In this case externalities across regions increase investment returns within a region
towards the threshold of endogenous growth, despite decreasing returns of the
accumulated factors at the regional level. Regional economies grow at a constant rate
in the steady-state, so that the gap in product per capita will remain constant as well.
When regional externalities are strong enough to cause t+g>1, growth rates are
increasing in k and the gap will diverge without bound.
Supra-regional solution
We have described above some characteristics of this simple growth model with
regional externalities. It is well known that externalities cause a non-optimal solution
due to the fact that agents are not able to fully appropriate the returns of the
investment. This is the situation in the Romer-Lucas kinds of models. In our case, a
supra-regional agent would consider that an increase in k in region i will increase

































That is, she will consider the average k instead of just the one in a single region. The
Hamiltonian in this case is:
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The solution of the system from the first order conditions gives the optimal supra-
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Given that g>0, comparing (14) with (9), gc < gc (sr), that is, the market solution will
be sub-optimal. Therefore, we can say that a region invests at a lower rate than the
optimal for the set of the regional economies, given that it is just considering the
return within the region. On the other hand, a supra-regional agent will select a higher
investment rate because it will consider that an additional unit of investment increases
the aggregate level of technology, increasing thus the one in its neighbours. Here we11
can, for instance, think of the role of investments in human capital, R+D or public
infrastructures. This result would justify the existence of supra-agencies for spurring
regional investment.
Regional Poverty Traps
Murphy et al (1989) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990) showed that the return of an
investment made by an agent may be highly affected by the aggregate stock in the
economy. In the case of industrialization, “...coordinated investment across sectors
leads to the expansion of markets for all industrial goods and can thus be self-
sustaining even when no firm can break even investing alone” (Murphy et al, 1989, pg
1005). In the case of, let’s say, investment in human capital by an agent, additional
amounts will be more productive when the aggregate level in the economy is high,
whereas they may cause no effect for very low levels.
vi
In a similar way, we think that across regional externalities may help explaining
spatial clusters of regions sharing high or low levels of development. That is, in th
elatter case, the existence of a poverty trap due to geographical location.
Let’s assume two groups of regional economies: regions in group A characterized by
low levels of k, and regions in group B with high levels of k. Regions within each







B, that is, regions surrounded by other regions with high capital intensity and high
product per capita will have higher steady-state values (in the case of decreasing
returns within the region) or higher growth rates (in the case of non decreasing returns
within the region).
Figure 1 describes the rates of growth for regions in each group when t=1. In this case
economies grow at a constant rate in the steady state given the values for D and kri.
Given the same D for all the economies, 1/s(Dkri
g) will be higher in B, thus gk
A < gk
B.
Regions in group B will grow faster than regions in A just because they are close to
regions with high k. In this case, continuous polarisation in two groups will emerge,
with constant inequality within each group.12
When there are decreasing returns to capital factors within the region, t<1, the story is
described by Figure 2.
vii In the proximities of kA
*, decreasing returns operate.
However, from x the externality due to capital in the neighbours more than
compensates decreasing returns to the own stock, forcing an upward sloping curve. In
any case, the steady state is given by kA
* for such levels of k. Once the threshold level
km is reached, the economy converges to an upper steady state, characterized by kB
*.
For the group of regions with high level of k, the regional spillover (g) may or may not
compensate the mechanism for internal decreasing returns for values of k beyond z. In
the former case (dashed line), constant growth would characterize regions in B, while
in the latter the steady state will be determined by kB
*. Figure 3 summarizes the
evolution of product per capita for each one of the cases.
viii
Therefore, as a consequence of the interdependence between neighbouring regions, a
situation with two (or more) separate spatial clusters may emerge. A group of regional
economies characterized by low endowment of factors that are not able to leave each
one alone the gravity attraction of the group and another group with high endowments
that can even show long run per capita growth.
The fundamental question at this point will be how can a regional economy get out of
this poverty trap?. It is obvious that the effort needed to escape will be lower when
their neighbours are simultaneously investing. If they are not, the individual effort
could be useless.
An important point in this analysis is the one of the break point in the space. That is,
why does not technological diffusion span to all regions or what is the origin of
nonconvexities that generate multiple steady states associated to different spatial
locations?. Following the idea of threshold externalities in Azariadis and Drazen
(1990), the spillover measure, g, may be different across the two groups in our
previous example, tending to zero in the case of regions in one group with regions in
the other. Another possibility will be in line with the idea in Leung and Quah (1996)
and Quah (1997). Natural grouping of economies emerges when economies within a13
group interact more with each other than with others in other groups. The result is
convergence toward a similar steady state of the members of each group although the
steady state varies across groups.
Rodríguez-Pose (1998) discusses the receptivity or aversity to incorporate and to
adapt innovations from other economies. Even in a world with no barriers or frictions
to the diffusion of technology, economies will diverge in their ability to appropriate
these innovations. If we just think that neighbouring regions share similar social,
cultural and economic characteristics, diffusion and appropriation of innovations will
be more intense among them than in the case of regions in different spaces.
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical model that will be estimated in this paper is based on equations (1) and
(2). Specifically, and following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992), we include in the production function both physical and human
capital:
yA k h it it it it
kh =
qq (15)
being kit and hit physical and human capital per worker respectively, and qi (i=k,h) the
measure of internal returns at the firm level. As exposed above, Ait is partially
endogenous in this model, reflecting both an externality within the region i of
accumulation in k and h, and the technological interdependence across neighbouring
regional economies. Then:





where Dt collects the state of technology generated exogenously and di (i=k,h) are the
measure of external returns within the region to physical and human capital (caused by
the effects of the accumulation of these factors in each region). Arit is total factors
productivity of the neighbours to region i, collecting the process of diffusion of ideas
and innovations across close regions, being g the intensity of these interdependences.














Then, substituting (16) and (17) into (15), the final expression for the production
function is, after log-linearization:
ix
ln ln ( )ln ( )ln (ln ln ln ) yk h y k h i t tk ki th hi t i t k i t h i t =+ + + + + - - Dq d q d g qq rrr (18)
As we can see from (18), (qk+dk) and (qh+dh) capture the strength of total (internal
plus external within the region) returns to physical and human capital associated with
the stock of domestic factors. But we can actually get an estimation of the internal
returns (qi) from the parameters associated to factors in the neighbours. In this way we
will be able to get an estimation of internal returns to physical and human capital,
social returns within the region (or externalities within the regional economy), di, and
the spillover or across-regions externalities parameter (g). As has been noted by
Ciccone (1997), all of these can be obtained by using aggregated regional or national
data.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that, in order to simplify the final specification, the same
value for the internal and external returns is assumed for all regions, as well as the
same intensity for the across-regions spillover. In this sense, it is sensible thinking
that, depending on the characteristics of each region, the effect of factors
accumulation in the neighbouring regions could be different. For example, Coe and
Helpman (1995) show that the effects of foreign R+D on domestic productivity are
stronger the more open the economy is to foreign trade. So, in small economies the
elasticity is larger with respect to the foreign R+D capital stock (the reverse applies in
large economies). In the same way, Kubo (1995) theoretically specifies different
parameters for internal returns and for regional externalities for two different regions,
studying the consequences on regional development depending on which parameter is
higher in each region.
Finally, it is necessary to point out two questions regarding expression (18). Firstly,
we will relax the assumption of a common Dt for all the economies in the sample. As
pointed out by Islam (1995), even assuming equal growth in technology, its initial
level may differ across economies if it reflects not just technology but resource
endowments, climate, institutions etc. Secondly, we assume that innovations
instantaneously spill over across economies, that is, the specification does not include15
a dynamical process of technological diffusion. This would be a restrictive assumption
when innovations spread quickly within the territory of the economy where the
innovation has been generated, but only a fraction in each time period spills over into
other economies or there is a lag in this process.
5. SPATIAL ECONOMETRICS: A PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERING REGIONAL
EXTERNALITIES
From expression (18) two relevant points must be noted. First, we are considering the
same production function for all regions. However, it may exist differences across
them, specially in the exogenous technological parameter. Considering this fact,
rewrite ln Dt as follows:
() ln ln ln DD D ti
gt
i eg t == + 00
() () (19)
In this way, ln D0i is allowed to be different for each region, while g(t) summarizes the
exogenous rate of technological change. As stated above, and following Mankiw et al
(1992) and Islam (1995), D0i would be reflecting initial differences not only in
technology but also in resource endowments, climate and institutional conditions.
Given that in our empirical exercise we deal with a pool of data, we will implement a
panel data approach to consider these differences in the form of unobservable
individual effects. So, as Islam (1995) notes, the omitted variable bias, due to the
likely correlation among lnD0i and the included explanatory variables, could be
avoided. Regarding the g(t) component, we can either include a trend as a regressor or
time dummies. In the latter case, a common cyclical behaviour for the regions will be,
in some sense, considered.
x
The second point that is noteworthy from expression (18) is its similarities with the
habitual specifications used in Spatial Econometrics.
xi It allows us to use the concept
of spatial dependence (or spatial autocorrelation)
xii in order to test for the presence of
regional externalities in the production function. Specifically, equation (18) could be
rewritten as (including an error term):
() lny lnA lnk lnh lny lnk lnh u =+ + + + + - - + () () qd qd g q q kk hh k h WW W (18’)16
where a bold character represents a vector (N*T)*1 with the information for each
region (n=1,...,N) and time period (t=1,...,T). Wlny, Wlnk and Wlnh are respectively
the spatial lags for labor productivity and physical and human capital per worker. In




































being O a (N*N) matrix of zeros and Ct (t=1,2,...,T) a (N*N) matrix of weights, where













Pjt is the employed population in region j in period t and Sij a contiguity factor that
equals 1 when i and j are neighbours and 0 otherwise. Expression (20) implies that
only contemporaneous spatial dependence is considered, that is, spatial dependence
between different periods is supposed to be zero. In this way, interdependencies across
regions are considered by including a weighted average of the value of labor
productivity and physical and human capital in the neighbouring regions. In addition,
it is interesting to note that the omission of a significative spatial lag of any variable
would lead to the presence of spatially correlated residuals (substantive spatial
dependence).
Moreover, it could be possible that the spatial autocorrelation was just present in the
error term as a consequence of the existence of spatial dependence among some
variables included on it or a poor matching between natural and administrative
boundaries of the analysed spatial units (spatial dependence as a nuisance). In this
second case, the correct specification for the production function would be:
lny lnA lnk lnh u =+ + + + + () () q d q d kk hh (22)17
uu e e =+ ~ ls WN I (, ) 0
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that includes a spatial autoregressive structure in the error term, being l the spatial
autoregressive parameter. It measures the intensity of interdependencies across the
residuals. In this sense, it is necessary to point out that the omission of a significant
scheme of residual spatial autocorrelation has important consequences to the least
squares estimation: inefficient estimators, biased estimation of the residual variance,
inflated values for the R
2 and the invalidation of the habitual  inference procedures.
Taking into account these ideas and in order to check if regional externalities are
empirically significant in the production function, we adopt the strategy proposed for
this case in Vayá et al (1998):
xiii
- Firstly, start estimating the habitual production function, without lags of the
endogenous and exogenous variables, by the appropriate panel estimation
technique (pool, fixed or random regional and/or time effects). A Hausman test
and the significance of the effects will be the criteria for the choice.
- Secondly, we compute for the appropriate model before, a) the LM-err
(Burridge, 1980) and the LM-EL (Bera and Yoon, 1992) statistics, and b) the
LM-lag (Anselin, 1988b) and LM-LE (Bera and Yoon, 1992), in order to test




-if both groups of tests lead to the non rejection of the null hypothesis, we will
assume the non existence of regional externalities in the production function;
-if just the tests of substantive spatial autocorrelation were significant or if
both groups were significant but the probability value for the former group was
higher, it would be necessary to introduce a spatial lag of the labor productivity
(W lny), using the spatial maximum likelihood estimator (ML) instead of the18
LS estimator.
xv Next, a spatial lag for physical and human capital per worker
could be included, checking their significance by means of the LR-test.
Finally, in the case that these lags were jointly significant and there were no
evidence of residual spatial autocorrelation in the last model, (18’) would be
the correct production function, confirming the relevance of the technological
interdependence among neighbouring regions;
-if only the residual autocorrelation tests were significant or, in the case that
both groups were significant but the probability of the tests in the former group
was higher,
xvi we would estimate (22) by ML.
xvii At this point, if there is no
evidence of substantive spatial dependence, we must conclude on the absence
of any external effect in the variables included in the production function,
although the spatial correlation in the residuals advises on the existence of
other sources of spatial dependence.
6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Data
We have estimated a production function considering the likely existence of regional
spillovers using data for the Spanish regions (NUTII classification) for the period
1964-1991. Data have been obtained from three sources. First, gross value added in
constant pesetas and the number of employed population from the periodical
publication Renta Nacional de España y su distribución provincial, published by
Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya. The net stock of privately held physical capital comes from
Fundación BBV (1996). It is measured in constant pesetas. Finally, human capital is
approached by the fraction of the employed population which has at least started
secondary schooling. They include, thus, workers that have started higher studies. This
information is from Mas et al (1995).
Given that the first source publishes the data every two years (excluding 1964 and
1967), we have information for 14 periods. Then, we deal with a panel of 17 regions
and 14 time periods. This will allow us to consider unobservable regional and time
effects. The variables for the neighbours of each region has been computed by19
multiplying a (17*14)*(17*14) weighted contact matrix W to the variables in the
model, as described above.
Results
The results for our empirical exercise are summarized in table 3. We have followed
the strategy described in the previous section, considering the empirical model with
across-regions externalities as well.
Results for the production function without regional spillovers are in columns 1 to 3
whereas those including externalities are in columns 4 and 5. In column 1 we have the
estimation of equation (15) using the OLS estimator for the pooled data. Results of the
estimation considering fixed regional effects and fixed regional and time effects are in
columns 2 and 3 respectively. We also considered the estimation including a time
trend instead of the time effects but this was not significant. A Hausman test for
choosing between the random and the fixed effect specification clearly discriminates
in favour of the latter. Furthermore, both the F and the likelihood-ratio tests strongly
reject the null hypothesis of non significance of both the regional and time effects.
Then, we take column 3 as the proper estimation. It does not allow to separate internal
from external within the region returns to physical and human capital. In the case of
physical capital, we obtain qk+dk = 0.47, being highly significant. The return for
human capital is 0.19 (highly significant as well). These results are similar to those
estimated in previous studies for the Spanish case (Mas et al, 1994; De La Fuente,
1996a and 1996b).
In order to check for the presence of (substantive and nuisance) spatial autocorrelation
in the residuals of the estimated function, we compute the Lagrange Multipliers tests
commented in the previous section. In the specification without time effects (column
2), all of these tests reject the null of no spatial autocorrelation. However, when time
effects are included (column 3) results are not so conclusive. So, although the LM-err
and specially LM-lag test evidence a strong misspecification of the estimated function
due to the omission of a spatial dependence scheme, the robust tests (LM-EL and LM-
LE) are not significant, dramatically in the case of nuisance autocorrelation. In this20
case, the asymptotic properties and the dependence of these kinds of tests on residuals
normality could explain these results.
In any case and given the mixed evidence, we incorporate a spatial lag of the
endogenous variable (Wlny) with the aim of removing the probable spatial
autocorrelation in the residuals of the production function. Once the strong
significance of this variable was observed,
xviii we also included a spatial lag of
physical and human capital. This is consistent with the strategy exposed previously
and also with the specification of technological interdependence in our empirical
model.
Results for the non linear least squares estimation of the equation (18´) with regional
dummies appear in column 4. Unlike previous results, this will allow us to disentangle
internal from external within the region returns to physical and human capital. In
addition, we obtain an estimation for g, that is, the intensity of regional externalities.
Its estimated value in this specification is quite large (0.79) and the hypothesis of
absence of across regions spillovers is strongly rejected. This means that a 10 percent
increase in the level of total factor productivity of the neighbours rises the level of
technology in one region by almost 8 percent. This result supports the idea of very
strong technological spillovers or interdependencies across neighbouring regions. The
estimated value is slightly higher than the one estimated by Ciccone (1997) for a wide
sample of countries.
xix
Moreover,  qk+dk = 0.46 and qk=0.47, being dk  negative although not statistically
different from zero. In the case of human capital, qh+dh=0.19 while qh is 0.14. As a
result, estimated external returns within the regions associated to the accumulation of
human capital, dh, reach 5%, opposite to what happened in the case of physical capital.
So, the larger the aggregate stock of human capital in an economy, the higher the total
effect of new investments in this factor. The latter result is in line with the idea in, for
instance, Lucas (1988), although for a sample of countries Ciccone (1997) obtained no
external effect from human capital accumulation. Among the possible explanations,
we could mention the smaller territory in the case of regional economies, that could
exacerbate externalities from human capital, and the evolution of this factor in the21
Spanish economy in the last decades. It is worth noting that the Spanish regions all
went from less than 10% in the percentage of employed population with medium-high
schooling to more than 50% in the period considered in this study (see Mas et al,
1995).
Non linear least square estimation with fixed time effects was also computed.
However, the hypothesis of no significance of these effects was not rejected. This is
against the result obtained with the estimation without externalities (column 3). This
could mean that the spatial lag of the variables are picking up most of the behaviour
considered by the time dummies. That is, it could be incorporating a cyclical
component common across neighbouring regions. So that, the estimation for the
spillover parameter could be collecting both a technological and a demand-driven
externality (in the sense of Bartelsman et al, 1994).
Finally, as a consequence of the inconsistency of the least square estimation when a
spatially lagged endogenous variable is included, we estimate equation (18’) by ML.
Column 5 displays the results for this case. The estimation for qk+dk and for qh+dh are
similar to those obtained in column 4. However, the value for the regional externality
is just 0.47 in this case, although it continues to be significantly different from zero.
External returns within the regions to physical capital take a value similar to that in
the previous estimation (not different from zero), but the ones to human capital
dramatically increase. Therefore, in this estimation less than the 25% of the total
effect of the human capital accumulation is due to internal returns, whereas the rest
would be due to the externality within the region. It has to be said that once the
externality has been included the spatial autocorrelation in the residuals totally
disappears, as evidenced by the non significance of the LR-err test.
To sum up, two facts could be derived from column 4 and 5: first, the existence of
external returns within the regions to, specifically, human capital, that could be even
more important than internal returns; and, second, the relevance of technological
interdependences across neighbouring Spanish regions.
7. CONCLUSIONS22
This paper has considered the effects of externalities across regional economies. Two
main objectives were established at the beginning of the paper: to analyse the
theoretical role of regional externalities in growth and convergence and to check the
empirical relevance of these effects.
A simple model of growth has been exposed, in which the level of technology of a
region depends on the one of its neighbours. It considers that technology is a function
of capital stock and the flow of innovations and ideas across neighbouring regions.
From this simple model, three main conclusions have been derived. Firstly, the growth
rates of a region are a function of the stock of capital in its neighbours. Then, the
presence of regional externalities may cause endogenous growth, even in the presence
of decreasing returns within the region. Secondly, as a consequence of the externality,
the market solution is not Pareto-optimal: a region decides to invest at a rate lower
than the optimal considering the benefits that this action causes to its neighbours. This
result could justify the existence of supra-regional agencies for promoting regional
investment, due that they could take into account this kind of externality. Thirdly, we
have shown how across-regional externalities may explain the presence of clusters of
regions, spatially concentrated, with low levels of development, that is, the existence
of poverty traps due to geographical location.
Regarding the empirical evidence, using data for the Spanish regions during the period
1964-1991, some results could be pointed out. First, we have detected the existence of
high (from 0.47 to 0.78, depending on the estimation) and significant technological
spillovers across regions in the production function. It would support the idea that
spatial autocorrelation in product per capita across regions would be due not just to
autocorrelation in investment rates but also to interdependence in technological levels.
Second, the empirical specification has allowed us to estimate internal and external
within the region returns to physical and human capital from aggregate regional data
in a straight forward way. There seems to be no evidence for an externality in physical
capital accumulation. The opposite happens in the case of human capital, where the
external within region returns to this factor has a value that ranges from 5% to 16%,
depending on the estimation.23
This paper has also shown a natural framework for considering empirically regional
externalities. We have proposed the use of spatial econometrics techniques for this
purpose.
 Finally, some questions derived from the paper are in our future research agenda. A
deeper analysis on the channels for the diffusion of technology must be done. In this
sense, the paper has considered physical contiguity  for defining neighbourhood.
Nevertheless, it seems sensible considering some others mechanisms as trade or
network communications that could strongly connect two or more regions, whatever
the physical distance among them. Furthermore, the same production function has
been specified for all regions, while it could be the case of, for instance, different
intensity in the diffusion of technology across different types of economies. Finally,
and in line with Vayá et al (1998), it would be worthy to analyze theoretically and
empirically the consequences of the presence of regional externalities for the rate of
convergence of regional economies.
                                                          
i In the rest of the paper we will refer to regional externalities and regional spillovers as across-regions
externalities.
ii Nevertheless,  Keller (1997) casts some doubts on trade as the unique channel for diffusion of
technology. Foreign R+D investments keep their significance in a growth equation when they are
randomly weighted, instead of using the volume of imports in the trade partners as weights. The
conclusion is that other channels must exist for knowledge diffusion besides trade in goods.
iii  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch.12), Ades and Chua (1997), Ciccone (1997) and Vaya et al (1998)
are exceptions to this sentence.
iv  It is noteworthy that we consider the aggregate level of technology as a function of capital intensity
instead of as a function of the stock. In this way we avoid the problem of a scale effect.
v  We consider this component common to each economy although in the empirical model we will allow
for differences across economies.
vi  Just imagine the solitude of a genetic engineer in the pre-historic era.
vii  This figure has been frequently used to illustrate the mechanism of poverty traps. See for instance
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995 pg 50).
viii  We have taken the idea of these graphs from Durlauf and Quah (1998).
ix  This specification has much in common with the one in Ciccone (1997). The main difference would
be that in here we have an autoregressive spatial representation instead of the moving average in the
Ciccone’s paper. The estimation of all the effects from (18) is straight forward.
x Despite in this kind of analysis both fixed and random effects models could be estimated, the first one
is habitually preferred given that it is likely that the unobservable regional effects were correlated with
regressors in the equation, causing the inconsistency of the random effects model. In any case, a
Hausman test will be computed in order to choose the appropriate specification.
xi See Anselin (1988a) and Anselin and Florax (1995) for a detailed survey of Spatial Econometrics.
xii Spatial dependence appears when one thing happening in one region affects to another region and the
reverse, that is, when there are interdependencies among different spatial units.
xiii We adapt the strategy of Spatial Variable Expansion 2 (SAVE) proposed by Florax and Folmer
(1992) to the case of regional spillovers in the production function.
xiv A brief description of these tests is given in the appendix.
xv The presence of a spatially lagged endogenous variable causes the LS estimator to be biased and
inconsistent (see Anselin 1988a).24
                                                                                                                                                                     
xvi See Bera and Yoon (1992) and Anselin et al (1996) for the advantages of computing the robust tests
of LM-EL and LM-LE and their utility in the process of choosing between the residual or the
substantive spatial autocorrelation model.
xvii Once (22) has been estimated by ML it is necessary to compute the common factor test (COMFAC
test) in order to check the consistence of this model. The model with spatially correlated errors would
not be appropriate when the value for the COMFAC test were highly significant.
xviii Result not supplied but provided by the authors upon request.
xix He gets a value of 0.58 for international technology spillovers using the sample of 98 countries in
Mankiw et al (1992).References:
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Appendix 1. Spatial dependence tests












where C is a (N*N) matrix of weights,  $ s
2  is the standard deviation of the OLS
residuals (the product of the vector of OLS estimated residuals (e) divided by the
number of observations -N-), and P=trace(C’C+C
2). Under the null hypothesis of no
spatial residual correlation in the residuals, the test is distributed as a c
2
1 .















where y is the endogenous variable, RJ P CX M CX =+ () ’ () / $ bb s
2, CXb is the spatial
lag of the predicted values from the OLS estimation, M=I-X(X’X)
-1X’ is the
projection matrix, P and C are defined as above. Under the null hypothesis of no
significant spatial lag of the endogenous variable, the test is distributed as a c
2
1.
Despite these statistics were specified for a cross-section sample, it is possible to use
them for a pooled data. In our case, we have replaced the (N*N) matrix of weights C
by a matrix W, (N*T)*(N*T) as defined in (20).29
Figure 1. Growth in two groups of regions with different k, when t=1
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Figure 2. Growth in two groups of regions with different k, when t<1
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Figure 3c. Evolution of y in two groups of regions with different k when t<1 but t+g=1








A2Table 1. Aggregate cross-industry correlations, Solow’s residual growth (upper)
              and GVA growth (lower)













      0.47  0.24 -0.24 -0.12  0.77  0.41 -0.37  0.45  0.07  0.31   0.16
0.45        0.15 -0.12 -0.32  0.65  0.17 -0.09  0.17  0.21  0.41   0.56
0.25  0.31        0.13  0.17  0.22  0.45  0.25  0.42  0.94  0.22  -0.07
0.33  0.70  0.32        0.26 -0.20  0.54 -0.05  0.16  0.16  0.41  -0.23
0.22  0.45  0.55  0.51       -0.06 -0.09  0.54  0.41  0.08  0.00  -0.38
0.76  0.76  0.43  0.60  0.54        0.20 -0.01  0.59  0.08  0.14   0.20
0.39  0.21  0.33  0.62  0.24  0.47       -0.20  0.34  0.43  0.68  -0.28
0.02  0.50  0.71  0.40  0.68  0.51  0.20        0.46  0.36 -0.00  -0.09
0.52  0.61  0.64  0.74  0.69  0.80  0.60  0.60        0.34  0.33  -0.07
0.55  0.58  0.83  0.65  0.63  0.74  0.65  0.69  0.87        0.39   0.02
0.49  0.69  0.42  0.78  0.55  0.77  0.71  0.63  0.81  0.83        -0.07
0.46  0.92  0.37  0.75  0.45  0.79  0.20  0.59  0.69  0.62  0.71
Average correlation Solow residual = 0.28,  GVA = 0.56
Table 2. Aggregate cross-region correlations, Solow’s residual growth (upper) and GVA growth (lower)
















       0.47  0.28  0.19 -0.00  0.34  0.61  0.23  0.13  0.77  0.57  0.37  0.35  0.42  -0.44
0.51        -0.21  0.23 -0.08  0.38 -0.05  0.15 -0.15  0.69  0.70  0.74  0.43  0.23  -0.20
0.45   0.36        0.05  0.57 -0.18  0.38  0.13  0.09 -0.02 -0.21 -0.02  0.23  0.68  -0.03
0.06   0.38  0.60        0.28  0.43  0.36 -0.57  0.47  0.42  0.06  0.21  0.27  0.06  -0.39
0.17   0.10  0.75  0.39       -0.13  0.41 -0.26  0.00 -0.15  0.10 -0.02  0.46  0.38  -0.24
0.59   0.51 -0.37  0.53  0.11        0.45  0.33  0.27  0.31  0.55  0.29  0.00  0.31  -0.24
0.84   0.67  0.48  0.35  0.33  0.67        0.18  0.19  0.37  0.39 -0.08  0.38  0.51  -0.60
0.35   0.68  0.46 -0.53  0.18  0.62  0.64       -0.45 -0.00  0.41  0.12  0.01  0.52  -0.06
0.41   0.09  0.23  0.54  0.00  0.58  0.32  0.08        0.16 -0.27  0.04 -0.45 -0.24   0.40
0.52   0.60 -0.33  0.39  0.17  0.23  0.67  0.55  0.14        0.46  0.49  0.36  0.23  -0.39
0.72   0.83 -0.40  0.20  0.32  0.63  0.85  0.70  0.11  0.54        0.61  0.37  0.24  -0.53
0.50   0.85 -0.26  0.44  0.07  0.57 -0.72  0.54  0.33  0.44  0.74       -0.03 -0.00  -0.18
0.34   0.41  0.49  0.21  0.63  0.21  0.55  0.51 -0.34  0.62  0.59  0.15        0.60  -0.57
0.40   0.46  0.92  0.51  0.59  0.37  0.41  0.51  0.03  0.32  0.39  0.22  0.54        -0.26
-0.31  -0.14 -0.03  -0.40 -0.12 -0.12 -0.33  0.03  0.51 -0.01 -0.33 -0.12 -0.48 -0.12
Average correlation Solow residual = 0.30,  GVA = 0.41
Notes: Significant coefficients at 10% in bold. Data from the Industrial Survey of Spain supplied by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística for the period 1980 to 1991. Grow in the Solow residuals has been obtained
as the residual in a Cobb-Douglass production function using labour and private capital as inputs.33
Table 3. Results for the empirical model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
qk + dk 0.244  (0.038) 0.442  (0.033) 0.471  (0.042) 0.457  (0.040) 0.4502(0.0378)
qh  + dh 0.498  (0.024) 0.346  (0.021) 0.195  (0.046) 0.187  (0.037) 0.205  (0.036)
g 0.787  (0.104) 0.478  (0.062)
qk 0.474  (0.058) 0.476
qh 0.138  (0.051) 0.042
regional dummies NO YES YES YES YES
time dummies NO NO YES NO NO
Ln L 234.252 371.302 404.946 411.548 397.594
Hausman-test
1 28.160  (p:0.000)
Likelihood-Ratio test













LM-LAG 40.490  (p:0.000)
LR-ERR 0.524  (p:0.469)
Notes: 1) Hausman test for selecting between a fixed effects and a random effects models.
2) Likelihood ratio test for significance of regional fixed effects in column 2 and for time fixed effects in column 3.
3) For the estimated parameters in the model, the standard deviation is supplied in brackets.
    The probability value in (p:) is supplied for the values of the tests.